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EQUAL PROTECTION
N. Y CONST. art. 1, § 11:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Hernandez 373
(decided February 22, 1990)
The defendant, a Latino convicted of two counts of both at-
tempted murder and criminal possession of a weapon, argued that
his equal protection rights under the state374 and federal 375
constitutions, as defined under Batson v. Kentucky, 37 6 were vio-
373. 75 N.Y.2d 350, 552 N.E.2d 621, 553 N.Y.S.2d 85, cert denied in
part, Hemandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990); see Comment, Gender
Based Peremptory Challenges and the New York State Constitution, 8 TOURO
L. REv. 91 (1991).
374. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
375. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
376. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prosecution's race based peremptory challenges
were violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution).
To establish a prima facie claim of race based discrimination under Batson,
"the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group . . . and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to
remove from the venire members of the defendant's race." Id. at 96. The
defendant may also rely on the fact "that peremptory challenges constitute a
jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate."' Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
"ITihe defendant must [also] show that these facts and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to
exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This
combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of
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lated when the prosecution peremptorily challenged two Latino
prospective jurors. Under section 270.25 of the state Criminal
Procedure Law,377 both the prosecution and defense are
permitted up to twenty peremptory challenges. The prosecution
asserted that the challenges were proper under Batson because the
prospective jurors were excluded for non-racial reasons.
During the voir dire process, the prosecution peremptorily
challenged four Latino prospective jurors. According to the pros-
ecution, the first two challenges were exercised because each had
a brother who was prosecuted by the same district attorney's of-
fice and thus might be prejudiced against the state. These chal-
lenges were not contested by the defense. 378 The remaining two
challenges were contested because the defense believed that the
prosecution failed to offer a race neutral explanation for excusing
the Latino prospective jurors. When questioned by the trial judge
for the exercise of the peremptory challenges, the prosecution
stated that they were excused because he believed that the
prospective jurors might have "difficulties in their accepting the
official court interpreter's translation of the testimony of the
Spanish-speaking witnesses." ' 379 The court of appeals, deciding
the issue under federal law, held that the prosecution properly of-
fered a race neutral explanation for excluding the two Latino
prospective jurors and therefore did not constitute a Batson viola-
tion.380 The decision was subsequently upheld by the United
States Supreme Court. 381
The court of appeals ruled that the defense properly made out a
primafacie claim of a Batson violation since the only four Latino
prospective jurors on the jury venire were excluded by the prose-
cution's peremptory challenge. According to Batson, once a
prima facie claim of discrimination is made out, the prosecution
must offer a race neutral explanation to rebut the claim. Here, the
the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination." Id.
377. N.Y. CRmi. PRoc. LAW § 270.25 (MeKinney 1982).
378. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 354, 552 N.E.2d at 622, 553 N.Y.S.2d at
86.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 356, 552 N.E.2d at 623-24, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88.
381. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
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prosecution stated that it excluded the two prospective jurors be-
cause they hesitated when asked whether they could accept the
court interpretetor's translation of the witness testimony. The
court accepted this explanation as being race neutral, noting that
"[h]esitancy or uncertainty about being able to decide the case on
the same evidence which binds every member of a jury is a
proper, neutral and nondiscriminatory basis for the prosecutorial
exercise of peremptory challenges.- 382
The court felt no need to address the defendant's equal protec-
tion rights under the state constitution noting that, "analysis of
the record and issues of this case on the merits would produce the
same result under the Federal and State equal protection
right . . "383
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kaye disagreed with the majority
view of applying only federal law, contending that this decision
could have been properly settled under state constitutional
law.384 The judge believed that settling this case under state
constitutional law would provide the court with the opportunity to
enunciate broader protection for the criminal defendant and the
unfairly excluded prospective juror than is provided under the
Federal Constitution. In this instance, the judge contended that
the prosecution's explanation, while race neutral on its face, was
still discriminatory because it has a disparate impact upon the
racial group. Because most Latinos speak only Spanish,
according to the judge, they can still be subject to systematic
exclusion by peremptory challenge. 385
In a concurring opinion, Judge Titone agreed with the majority
decision, but advised that the state legislature should re-examine
the peremptory challenge statute given the new federal constitu-
tional requirements announced in Batson. The judge recom-
mended that the legislature should lower the amount the peremp-
382. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 357-58, 552 N.E.2d at 624, 553 N.Y.S.2d
at 88.
383. Id. at 358, 552 N.E.2d at 624, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
384. Id. at 360, 552 N.E.2d at 626, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
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tory challenges allowed under the present statute. This change,
Judge Titone concluded, would still allow the prosecution and de-
fense to exclude suspected prospective jurors, but reduce the op-
portunity for systematic exclusion of certain racial groups. 3 86
People v. Kern38
7
(decided March 29, 1990)
Three defendants, two convicted of manslaughter, assault and
conspiracy and one convicted of manslaughter and assault, con-
tended that neither the state nor federal constitution prohibits a
criminal defendant from exercising race based peremptory chal-
lenges. 388Peremptory challenges, provided under section 270.25
of the state's Criminal Procedure Law, 389 allow both the defense
and prosecution to exclude a prospective juror without having to
supply a reason. 390 The issue was whether such challenges vio-
lated the equal protection clause391 and/or the civil rights
clause392 of the state constitution. The court held that both
clauses of the New York State Constitution prohibit racially
based peremptory challenges. 393
This appeal arises from the highly publicized "Howard Beach
incident" where three white youths were arrested for attacdng
386. Id. at 359, 552 N.E.2d at 625-26, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
387: 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, cert denied,
Kern v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
388. Id. at 648, 554 N.E.2d at 1239-40, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52.
389. N.Y. CRmi. PRoc. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1982).
390. See id.
391. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
The equal protection clause states that "[n]o person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof." N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 11.
392. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 650-51, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at
653. The civil rights clause states that "[n]o person shall, because of race,
color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state
or any agency or subdivision of the state." N.Y. CONST. art I, § 11.
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